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FEDERAL COURTS-RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-CONSTRUCTION OF

RuLE 50 (b )-This action was brought in a South Carolina state court and
removed to the federal district court on grounds of diversity of citizenship. After
the evidence of both parties had been presented, the court denied defendant's
motion for a directed verdict. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff. Although defendant filed .a motion for a new trial on grounds of
newly discovered evidence which the court denied, he did not move to have
the verdict and judgment set aside and to have judgment entered in his favor
· as he might have done under Rule 50 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Upon defendant's appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of App.eals, the

1 28 U.S.C. (1940), following § 723 c, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
50 (b) reads: ''Whenever a motion for a directe.d verdict made at the close of all the
evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have
submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions
raised by the motion. Within IO days after the reception of a verdict, a party who
has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion
for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within IO days
after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this
motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict was returned
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court found that the admission of certain evidence offered by plaintiff was
prejudicial error, and that without it, plaintiff's proof was not sufficient to go to
the jury; consequently, the court reversed and directed that judgment be entered
for the defendant,2 apparently finding its authority in Rule 50 (b). 8 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Rule 50 (b) does not
authorize an appellate court of the United States to direct a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if no motion for such judgment has been made in the
district court within ten days after the jury's discharge. Justice Black delivered
the opinion of the court. Cone v. vVest Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S.
212, 67 S. Ct. 752 (1947).
Justice Black gives two reasons why the construction of Rule 50 (b) adopted
by the circuit court of appeals is incorrect. First, he states that when a trial
court feels after the return of the verdict that it erred' in its refusal to direct
a verdict, Rule 50 (b) permits it either to enter judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or to order a new trial. He feels that this discretion is best exercised by the trial court which has seen and heard the witnesses, and that the
trial court would be deprived of it if the appellate court is permitted to direct
entry of judgment in cases where no motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was made below. His second reason is that the plaintiff has a qualified
right to dismiss 4 and if the motion to direct is renewed in the trial court, he
may exercise this right before the court directs against him; but if the motion
is not renewed in the trial court, and the appellate .court directs entry of judgment, then plaintiff loses his chance to ask for dismissal. Before the principal
case, three other circuit court of appeals decisions which were reversed by the
Supreme Court on other grounds seemed to support the construction of Rule
5 o (b) adopted below. In the first of these, Conway v. 0'Brien,5 decided in
the second circuit, the opinion was written by Judge Learned Hand who
reasoned that since Rule 50 (b) provided that when a motion for a directed
verdict was denied or for any reason not granted, the court was held to have
submitted the question to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal
questions raised by the motion, failure to vacate the ruling on the motion had
the same effect as an express denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. The second decision, Berry v. United States,6 was by the same
the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either
order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been
directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as
if the requested verdict had been directed or may order a new trial."
2
West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Cone, (C.C.A. 4th, 1946) 153 F. (2d)
576 at 582 the court stated: "Though nq motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (non obstante veredicto) was made in the lower court by the defendant, we
think, on the strength of the reasons discussed and the authorities cited in United
States v. Halliday, ... we have the power, (under Rule 50 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723 c) instead of ordering a new
trial, to direct the entry of judgment by the lower court in favor of the defendant."
3
28 U.S.C. (1940) following § 723 c, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
50 (b).
4
Id. Rule 41 (a) 2.
5
(C.C.A. 2d, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 611.
6
(C.C.A. 2d, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 615.
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court without a discussion of the procedural problem. The third case, United
States v. Halliday/ was decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
opinion was written by Judge Dobie who also wrote the opinion of the court
in the principal case. He saw nothing in Rule 50 (b) to restrict the power of
an appellate court as indicated by the decision in Baltimore & Carolina Line
v. Redman "to direct the entry of judgment by the lower court in favor of the
defendant, rather than to order the granting of a new trial, when the orderly
administration of justice seemed to require it" 8 even in cases where the ruling
below was in favor of the plaintiff and no- post verdict motion for judgment
had been made. Certainly, in any case where a motion for a directed verdict
has been denied below and an appellate court finds that the motion should have
been granted, some court must determine whether, in the interests of justice,
judgment should be entered or a new trial granted. Conceivably, this determination could be made by either the trial or the appellate court even in cases
where no motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was made below.9
By the principal case, the Supreme Court clearly indicates that unless the trial
court first rules on the question by disposing of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court is without power to order a judgment entered below.
D ante
· l W • R edd"in, JI

(C.C.A. 4th, 1941) 116 F. (2d) 812.
Id. at 816.
9 For a commentary on this problem written before the principal decision, see
4 Federal Rules Service 934 (1941).
7
8

